Abstract-In the internet environment, it is desirable for a user to login different servers by keying the same password and using the same smart card. This paper proposes an authentication and key agreement scheme with key confirmation for multi-server environments. Compared with the previous authentication and key agreement schemes for multi-server environments, the new scheme holds many merits. It satisfies the following properties: R1. Single registration; R2. User friendly; R3. Prevention of the replay, the password guessing without smart cards, the impersonation and the stolen-verifier attacks; R4. Resistance against server spoofing; R5. Mutual authentication; R6. Two-factor authentication; R7.Resistance against known-key attacks; R8. Perfect forward secrecy; R9. Scalability of login; R10. Anonymity of users.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the internet environment, a user can access many resources which are distributed in many different places. Lamport introduces a password authentication scheme [1] for a singer server environment. However, in the password-based authentication schemes, the server often needs to store a verification table, which easily incurs the stolen-verification attacks [2] . Moreover, the password-based authentication schemes always suffer from password guessing attacks. Applying a smart card to password based authentication schemes in a singer server is a convenient way [3] [4] [5] [6] . If one extends the password smart card based authentication methods in a single server environment to the multi-server environment, it is infeasible. Since each user needs to have different passwords with different remote servers in the multi-server environment.
Some smart card based password authentication schemes for the multi-server environment are proposed [7, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 14, 15] . But the scheme in [7] does not fit for smart card, since one high computation cost method, the neural networks, is used. Many schemes are insecure [8, 14, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . For example, the scheme [13] cannot resist against impersonation attacks, and server spoofing attacks. Furthermore, it fails to provide mutual authentication [14, 17, 18] . Hsiang and Shih proposed a secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment [17] . Tan , we highlight the requirements of smart card based authentication and key agreement schemes with privacy-preservation for multi-server environments: R1. Single registration: A user is required to register once and can login to the eligible servers many times; R2. User friendly: A user can change his password freely; R3. Prevention of the replay, the password guessing without smart cards, the impersonation and the stolen-verifier attacks [20]; R4. Resistance against server spoofing: A server cannot impersonate other servers to cheat users or masquerade some users to cheat other servers; R5. Mutual authentication: The scheme can provide the mutual authentication between the servers and users; R6. Two-factor authentication: When only a user's smart card or the password is comprised, the scheme still can prevent the adversary from masquerading as the user and the password guessing; R7.Resistance against known-key attacks; R8. Perfect forward secrecy: Even if long secret keys are compromised, the previous session keys should not be revealed; R9. Scalability of login: After a user has finished the first time login to a certain service provider server, any interaction with the registration center is not necessarily required when the user logins to the same service provider server once again; R10. Anonymity of users.
Of the above requirements, the requirement (R9) is essential. If an authentication and key agreement scheme for multi-server environments cannot provide the scalability of login, when many logins happen at the same time, the bottleneck will be caused. Since the registration center is required to engage in every login. It is desirable that the user logins the same service provider server not the first time without the participation of the registration center. However, it is necessary that the service provider server can control login of the user to avoid the abuse of login.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we proposed an authentication and key agreement scheme with key confirmation and privacy-preservation for multi-server environments. In Section III, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and compare its performance with the previous authentication and key agreement schemes for multi-server environments. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section IV.
II. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose a new authentication and key agreement scheme with key confirmation and privacy-preservation for multi-server environments. The following notations in Table 1 will be used throughout the paper.
An authentication and key agreement scheme for multi-server environments is involved with three parties, a user set, a server (as a service provider) set and a control server (as the registration center) RC. In our scheme, RC holds two master keys, x and y. The public system parameters include a large field F p of prime order p with p>2 160 , a base point G of order n in the elliptic curve E p , a secure hash function h( ) which maps any string into an element of Z n and a secure hash function H( ) which maps any string into an element of the elliptic curve group. Our scheme consists of four phases: the registration phase, the login phase, the authentication and key agreement phase, and the password change phase.
A. Registration Phase
The user U i and a service provider S j execute the following operation to complete the registration, respectively.
The service provider S j sends the identity sid j to the registration center RC. After RC receives sid j , RC calculates c j =h(sid j ||y)G and sends the secret information to S j through a secure channel.
In order to provide the privacy of the user U i , the user U i with a real identity id i chooses an indicator ind i as his blind identity. 
B. Case 1: For the-first-time-login B.1. Login Phase
When U i wants to access the resources of the server S j the first time, U i inserts his smart card and keys his identity id i and password pw i . Then the smart card, the server S j and the registration center RC execute the following steps to achieve mutual authentication and agree on a session key between the smart card and the server S j . The login phase for Case 1 is depicted as in Fig.1 
B.2. Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
The phase can be subdivided into three sub-phases. We depict it in Fig.2, Fig.3 and Fig.4 
B.2.3 Key Confirmation Phase
After the smart card and the server have authenticated the registration, in essence, they have also authenticated each other. Next, the two parties will compute the session key and confirm it through the following steps. 
C. Case 2: For not-the-first-time-login
After the user stores (D, || ) to the smart card after the first time of login, U i can obtain the service of the server S j without the participation of RC.
The login phase and authentication and key agreement phase are executed only between the user U i and the server S j .
C.1. Login phase
When U i wants to access the resources of the server S j not the first time, U i inserts his smart card and keys his identity id i and password pw i . The login phase for Case 2 is depicted as in Fig.5 
C.2. Authentication and key agreement phase
The phase can be subdivided into two sub-phases which are also depicted in Fig.6 and Fig.7 , respectively. 
C.2.1 Authentication

III. ANALYSIS ON THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In the following, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme satisfies all the requirements of smart card based authentication and key agreement schemes for multi-server environments, which is listed in Section 1. Theorem 1. Upon the assumption of the difficulty of the CDH problems, there is no any adversary who could (2) , 
, ) with the same probability. In essence, the adversary cannot obtain R i without B ci .
Assume that A could fake an authenticator | | | || 1 , or | | 1 ) with a non-negligible probability δ. A guesses the right hash value at the advantage or A generates and 1 . Without the knowledge of y, A obtains with the probability at most . If A generates , A could solve an instance ( , ,
) of CDH problems with the probability at least δ . □ Theorem 2. Upon the assumption of the difficulty of the CDH problems, there is no any adversary who could mount the server impersonation attacks. Proof. Suppose that an adversary A impersonates a remote server generating (ind i , , , , , and , for the first-time-login (or , for not-the first-time-login) to cheat a user U i or RC with a non-negligible probability ε.
Under that random oracle model, it implies that A could compute || and with a non-negligible probability. The former shows that A knows the value , which contradicts that is secret. The latter demonstrates that A can compute from ( , . That is, A solves an instance of CDH problems with a non-negligible probability ε . □ The theorem implies that the proposed scheme can resist against the server spoofing. Theorem 3. Upon the assumption of the difficulty of the CDH problem under the random oracle model, the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication between the user and the registration center, between the user and the server, and between the server and the registration center. Proof. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 imply that the server and the user are authenticated. Now, we show that the registration center will be authenticated by the server and the user, respectively.
The proposed scheme can prevent an attacker from obtaining the registration center's secret keys (x, y) or (h(ind i ||x),h(sid j ||y)). During the authentication, h(ind i ||x)G and h(sid j ||y)G are hashed into some values. One will be faced with a discrete logarithm problem if he wants to obtain h(ind i ||x) (h(sid j ||y)) from h(ind i ||x)G (h(sid j ||y)G). In addition, (x, y) are protected in a hashed form.
Suppose that an adversary A impersonates a registration center to issue ( , ) to the server S j and ( , ) to the user with a non-negligible probability ε. There must be the following equations: , the former of which is used to compute the first-time login message and the latter of which is used to compute the not-first-time login message.
The proposed scheme can resist against the undetectable on-line password guessing attack. Since RC can authenticate the user by checking the validity of the information { , }. The password is not contained in the verification equation || || . In addition, the off-line password guessing attacks will also fail in our proposed scheme. Since the password is protected in the smart card as B i =B ci ⊕ h(id i ||pw i )G. Theorem 3 proves that B ci is protected. is shared only by the user U i and the server U j . In the proposed scheme, the identity id i is anonymous. Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist offline password guessing attacks. Our scheme holds two-factor security. □ Theorem 5. Upon the assumption of the difficulty of the CDH problem under the random oracle model, the proposed scheme provides the perfect forward secrecy. Proof. Assume that an adversary A corrupts the registration center and obtains master keys x and y. The adversary can recover and after A has intercepted the transmitted messages. However, the adversary will have to be faced with an instance of CDH problems, when A tries to compute or from ( , ). □ Theorem 6. Upon the assumption of the difficulty of the CDH problem under the random oracle model, the proposed scheme can resist against known-key attacks.
Proof. Even if one session key is compromised, one still cannot determine other session keys. This is since every session key or . The parameters and are random integers. Therefore, the proposed scheme can provide known-key security. □ In addition, we briefly review the security properties:
(1) Resistance to Replay Attacks In the proposed scheme, the freshness of the messages transmitted and the shared session key are provided by the random nonces and . Theorem 5 Theorem 6 shows that only the user, the server and the registration center can recover and verify the random nonces and . Therefore, the proposed scheme can resist replay attacks.
(2) Resistance to Stolen Verifier Attacks From Section 2, we know that the proposed scheme does not need to maintain a verification table or password table in the servers or the registration center. Therefore, nobody obtain any verifiable information from the servers and RC. The proposed scheme can resist against the stolen verifier attacks. 
